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Non-foreign direct investment capital in￿ ows in China were particularly strong in 2003
and 2004. They were even stronger than current account surpluses or net foreign direct
investment in￿ ows. As a result, the pace of international reserves accumulation in China
increased signi￿cantly. This paper investigates if the rapid build up of international reserves
in 2003 and 2004 was a source of monetary instability in China. The relationship between
international reserves and domestic credit is examined with a Vector Error Correction Model
(VECM), estimated on monthly data from March 1995 to December 2005. Empirical results
show that this relationship was stable and consistent with monetary stability. Direct and
indirect Granger causality tests are implemented to show how the People￿ s Bank of China
(PBC) achieved this monetary stability.
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11 Introduction
During the 1997-1998 Asian ￿nancial crisis, the Chinese economy performed well. The limited
￿nancial liberalization is the main feature explaining why China￿ s ￿nancial system had been insu-
lated from the crisis. Its relatively closed ￿nancial account prevented the accumulation of foreign-
currency-denominated liabilities in the private sector. Capital controls also prevented destabilizing
currency attacks (Fernald and Babson, 1999). However, the ￿nancial liberalization in China pro-
gressed gradually over the last decade. The magnitude and the nature of capital ￿ ows in China
deeply changed. Capital controls became less e⁄ective and cannot provide a long lasting protection
anymore if incentives for capital in￿ ows linger (Ma and McCauley, 2004; Prasad and Wei, 2005).
Besides, reforms in the banking sector highlight the transformation of the Chinese economy from a
centrally planned economy to a market-based economy (Mo, 1999; Woo, 2002; Barnett, 2004). A
greater decision-making autonomy have been given to the banking sector and ￿ uctuations in bank
credit have now large implications for the macroeconomic situation1 (Hu, 2003). As a result, hot
money in￿ ows can henceforth fuel the Chinese ￿nancial system and provide excess liquidity to the
banking sector.
Over the last decade, China recorded strong current account surpluses and strong net foreign
direct investment (FDI) in￿ ows. Prasad and Wei (2005) show also that non-FDI capital in￿ ows in
China were particularly strong in 2003 and 2004. They were even stronger than current account
surpluses or net FDI in￿ ows. These non-FDI capital in￿ ows can be considered as hot money in￿ ows.
They were mainly driven by the interest rate di⁄erential between China and the United States (US),
coupled with expectations of a renminbi (RMB) revaluation. Current account surpluses and FDI
in￿ ows are rather driven by fundamentals.
Changes in international reserves of the People￿ s Bank of China (PBC) are given by current
account surpluses and ￿nancial account surpluses. Hot money in￿ ows in 2003 and 2004 increased
therefore signi￿cantly the pace of international reserves accumulation in China. In addition, the
1Even if the e¢ ciency of the banking secor remains low (Allen et al., 2005)
2central bank balance sheet identity de￿nes the monetary base as the sum of net domestic assets
plus net foreign assets (i.e. international reserves). Upsurges in international reserves, specially if
they o⁄set hot money in￿ ows, challenge therefore the PBC to manage the monetary base expansion
and more generally the money supply expansion. The rapid build-up in international reserves in
2003-2004 could have been a source of monetary instability. Excess liquidity could have been
provided to the banking sector, promoting in￿ ation pressures and an excessive credit expansion.
In this paper, we investigate if the rapid build-up in international reserves in 2003 and 2004 was
a source of monetary instability. Money supply is made up of domestic credit and international
reserves. The monetary stability that we consider is therefore related to the relationship between
international reserves and domestic credit. When the central bank intervenes in the foreign ex-
change market to o⁄set hot money in￿ ows and to keep the exchange rate stable, net foreign assets
increase in its balance sheet, leading (ceteris paribus) to a monetary base expansion. This injec-
tion of liquidity could positively a⁄ect the growth of output, monetary aggregates and domestic
credit. The central bank could lose the control of money supply and more precisely the control of
domestic credit. As a result, monetary stability implies that international reserves and domestic
credit should be (ceteris paribus) negatively related so that if one component of money supply
increases, the other one decreases to stabilize the overall money supply.
First, we examine with a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) on monthly data from March
1995 to December 2005 the relationship between international reserves and domestic credit. Empir-
ical results show that this relationship was stable and consistent with monetary stability. Second,
we explain how the PBC proceeded to manage the upsurge in international reserves and keep
domestic monetary condition under control. The PBC implemented sterilization measures in the
narrow sense (with open market operations) as well as in the broader sense (with reserve require-
ment ratio and window guidance). We examine with direct and indirect causality tests how broad
money and domestic credit had been a⁄ected by these sterilization measures. Empirical results
show that open market operations and reserve requirements did not drain all the liquidity. The
upsurge in international reserves led to monetary expansion. Nevertheless, we ￿nd that the PBC
3succeeded to shape domestic credit using window guidance.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II brie￿ y reviews causes and
implications of the upsurge in international reserves. Section III presents the empirical assessment
of monetary stability. Section IV investigates the management of net foreign assets. Section V
concludes.
2 Causes and implications of the upsurge in international
reserves
2.1 Hot money in￿ ows in China
The RMB has been convertible for current account transactions since 1996, but ￿nancial account
transactions are still under control (Xiaopu, 2003, Yongding, 2004): portfolio investments are con-
strained, foreign direct investments are oriented and main short term capital in￿ ows are forbidden.
Nevertheless, the People￿ s Republic of China (PRC) is not fully isolated from hot money in￿ ows.
Capital controls are not applied to each category of capital account transactions ￿several are free
or loosely managed (Xie, 2004)2.
The balance of payments roughly records the amount of hot money in￿ ows (Tung and Baker,
2004; Rzepkowski, 2004; Genberg et al., 2005; Prasad and Wei, 2005). In Table 1, "Hot Money"
is the sum of "Portfolio Investment", "Other Investment" and "Errors and Omissions" and cor-
responds therefore to non-FDI capital in￿ ows. First, signi￿cant portfolio investment in￿ ows are
recorded in the ￿nancial account. During 2003 and 2004, net portfolio investment in￿ ows were
respectively $11.43 and $19.69 billions. Second, Chinese banks and depositors manage foreign
assets. These transactions are recorded in the sub-section ￿Other Investment￿ in the ￿nancial
account but o¢ cial ￿gures can be misleading. In December 2003, the PBC used $45 billions of
its international reserves in order to recapitalize two state commercial banks. This operation was
2Prasad and Wei (2005) provide an extensive chronology of capital controls over the period 1980 - January 2005.
4recorded in the sub-section ￿Other Investment￿and the funds were allocated to a holding company
owned by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). As a result, other investment
in￿ ows represented $39.11 billions in 2003. Other investment in￿ ows represented also $37.91 bil-
lions in 2004. Last, some capital in￿ ows escape to regulatory controls but they are all the same
recorded in the balance of payments in the statistical discrepancy. Errors and omissions increased
signi￿cantly during 2003 and 2004 and represented respectively $18.42 and $27.05 billions3 which
contrasts with illegal capital out￿ ows noticed during the 1990￿ s (Gunter, 2004).
Hot money is mainly held by overseas Chinese (Chinese diaspora, mainly from Taiwan), Chi-
nese banks converting their foreign assets into RMB assets and Chinese households stopping the
accumulation of foreign deposits (Ma and McCauley 2003, 2004; Rzepkowski, 2004). Hot money
in￿ ows are estimated at $68.96 and $84.64 billions respectively in 2003 and 2004 (Table 1). They
are stronger than current account surpluses (respectively $45.87 and $68.66 billions) or net FDI
in￿ ows (respectively $47.23 and $53.13 billions) during these two years. Hence, the rapid increase
of international reserves during 2003 and 2004 o⁄set mainly non-FDI capital in￿ ows rather than
trade surplus or net FDI in￿ ows. Hot money in￿ ows increased therefore signi￿cantly the pace of
international reserves accumulation in China.
US interest rate changes could be the main factor explaining hot money in￿ ows. Figure 1 shows
that the international reserves upsurge started with the US interest rate cut in 2001 whereas the
Chinese interest rate has been roughly stable. The interest rate di⁄erential between China and
the US is linked to capital controls applied by the PBC but Cheung et al. (2003) also highlight
an increasing ￿nancial integration between the PRC and the US. Thus, the PBC has to consider
international issues as the ￿nancial liberalization comes into e⁄ect. In addition, exchange rate
expectations could constitute a second important factor explaining hot money in￿ ows. The PBC
applied up to July 2005 a ￿xed exchange rate against the US dollar but speculation around the
RMB appreciation has been going up according to the dollar general weakness and the commercial
3The evolution of the errors and omissions category may also in part re￿ect an accounting issue related to changes
in the dollar value of foreign asset (Prasad and Wei, 2005).
5imbalance between the US and China. The o⁄shore interest rate implied by the markets for non-
deliverable forwards (NDF) in Asian currency underlines this issue (Ma et al., 2004; Fung et al.,
2004)4.
According to Goldstein and Lardy (2003) and Tung and Baker (2004), the PBC could have
implemented a 15% revaluation of the RMB but speculators cannot expect anymore such a large
one-o⁄ revaluation. The new exchange rate arrangement announced in July 2005 makes clear that
the PBC will move gradually toward more exchange rate ￿ exibility. The PBC announced a 2.1%
appreciation of the RMB against the dollar and a move to a managed ￿ oat with reference to a
basket of currencies. This new exchange rate arrangement is heavily managed, the PBC allows a
daily trading band of +/- 3% around the exchange rate announced the day before. Besides, Figure
1 shows that the US interest rate is increasing since mid-2004, while the Chinese interest rate have
barely changed. As a result, incentives for hot money in￿ ows have been removed and hot money
in￿ ows evaporated in 2005 (Table 1).
2.2 International reserves and monetary stability
The following equations show how domestic credit and domestic prices can be a⁄ected by an
upsurge in international reserves. The equilibrium condition in the money market is provided by
the LM curve. The money demand results from a transaction motive and a speculative motive.
The money supply is endogenous and made up of domestic credit and international reserves. The




where Pt is the domestic price level, IRt the international reserves, DCt the domestic credit, yt
the output, it the real interest rate on domestic bonds and L(:) the money demand function with
4The evolution of Chinese foreign currency deposits is specially a⁄ected by the interest rate di⁄erential and the
exchange rate expectations (Ma and McCauley, 2002, 2003; Rzepkowski, 2004).
6Ly(:) > 0 and Li(:) < 05.
Assuming simpli￿ed commercial bank balance sheets, where liabilities consist of deposits and
where assets consist of required reserves, loans and bonds (Bernanke and Blinder, 1988; Greenwald
and Stiglitz, 1990), the bank lending level is given by
DCt = [(1 ￿ ￿)Dt]￿(it; ^ yt); (2)
where Dt are the deposits, ￿ the reserve requirement, ^ yt the output gap and 0 ￿ ￿(:) ￿ 1 the
fraction of bank assets loaned with ￿i(:) < 0 and ￿^ y(:) > 0. Risk-averse banks are less willing to
invest in loans when the rate of return on the less risky government bonds is high. Further, an
economic slowdown deteriorates the overall quality of the borrowing pool which reduces the willing
of commercial banks to supply credit.
Assuming a simpli￿ed central bank balance sheet where assets consist of net foreign assets
(NFAt) and net domestic assets (NDAt) and where the liability consists of the monetary base,





where MBt = NFAt + NDAt is the monetary base and ￿ the currency-demand deposit ratio.
In a ￿xed exchange rate system, changes in net foreign assets (￿NFAt) are determined by net
capital in￿ ows and current account.
￿NFAt = CAt + NK(qt ￿ Et(qt+1) + it ￿ i￿
t ￿ ￿t); (4)
where CAt is the current account balance, qt the domestic real exchange rate, Et(qt+1) ￿ qt the
real expected depreciation of the domestic currency, i￿
t the US real interest rate on bonds, ￿t the
risk premium and the extent of capital controls. NK(:) represents net capital in￿ ows and depends
5Lj(:) is the partial derivative with respect to variable j.
7positively on deviation from uncovered real interest rate parity (qt ￿ Et(qt+1) + it ￿ i￿
t ￿ ￿t).
Equations (1), (2), (3) and (4) show how international reserves can a⁄ect the monetary stability.
Changes in the foreign interest rate and in exchange rate expectations justify hot money in￿ ows
and then the build-up of international reserves. This upsurge in international reserves leads to a
monetary base expansion. This expansion is re￿ ected in deposits and can ￿nally cause an excessive
credit expansion and/or in￿ ation pressures if the money demand is stable. The central bank can
implement sterilization operations to control domestic monetary conditions6. First, net domestic
assets can be adjusted downward with open market operations. Second, the reserve requirement
can be increased to reduce the money multiplier. Finally, the central bank can use administrative
measures to curb domestic credit.
3 Empirical assessment of monetary stability
A VECM is estimated using monthly data from March 1995 to December 2005 to investigate the
stability of monetary conditions. We examine if the relationship between international reserves and
domestic credit was consistent with monetary stability. According to the equilibrium condition in
the money market, international reserves and domestic credit should exhibit a negative relationship
if the PBC succeeded in managing international reserves and in keeping domestic credit under
control.
3.1 Data and VECM speci￿cation
Endogenous variables are gross international reserves less gold (IRt), domestic credit (DCt), GDP7
at constant prices (yt), consumer prices (Pt) and US real interest rate (i￿
t). Due to data availability
and also to care about the scope of the VECM, the Chinese interest rate and exchange rate
expectations are not taken into account. Time series available on the Chinese interest rate start
6See Brissimis et al. (2002) for a model analysing o⁄setting capital ￿ows and sterilization.
7The Chow and Lin (1971) method is used to obtain the GDP monthly estimate. This method allows to obtain the
best linear unbiased estimates of a monthly series by regression on related series. We use the industrial production
index (IPI) as related series.
8in March 1997 and time series available on NDF start in August 2001 (we use the IFS database,
the ARIC database and the EcoWin database). Besides, the US interest rate is considered in the
cointegrating vector. This variable does not pose the problem of data availability and was a driving
force in the rapid upsurge in international reserves in 2003 and 2004. Finally, real e⁄ective exchange
rate (REERt) and banking system￿ s reserves (BRt) are considered as exogenous variables. These
variables control respectively for a competitive e⁄ect and for the monetary base expansion.
We use the log transformation of index variable (January 1996=100) for all variables except US
real interest rate (see the data appendix for the data sources). The original data on domestic credit
and international reserves are modi￿ed. First, the $45 billions used to recapitalize two national
banks are added to international reserves in order to have a good speci￿cation of the upsurge in
international reserves. Second, data on domestic credit showed a strong break in January 2002
corresponding to a 13% growth rate whereas it was around 1% during the previous months. We
therefore consider a 1% growth rate in January 20028.
Four unit root tests are implemented9: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), Elliott-Rothenberg-
Stock (DF-GLS), Phillips-Perron and Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS). We conclude
that domestic credit, GDP, US real interest rate, real e⁄ective exchange rate and banking system￿ s
reserves are non-stationary in level but stationary in ￿rst-di⁄erence. These variables are therefore
considered as I(1) variables. Besides, we conclude that international reserves and consumer prices
are non-stationary both in level and ￿rst di⁄erence but stationary in second di⁄erence. These
variables are therefore considered as I(2) variables. These statistical properties highlight that the
in￿ ation rate and the growth rate of international reserves are non-stationary. This outcome could
have been expected with Figure 1 and sums up the point of the paper: Did this I(1) growth rate
in international reserves lead to monetary instability or did the PBC succeed to manage the rapid
upsurge in international reserves and keep domestic credit under control?
The non-stationary growth rates of international reserves and consumer prices have strong
8These two modi￿cations allow to get residual normality without the introduction of dummy variables. Moreover
these two shocks would have introduced an isolated instability in the long term relation resulting from accounting
procedures.
9These tests are available upon request.
9implications for the VECM speci￿cation. First, the statistical relationship that we can investigate
is between the ￿rst di⁄erence of international reserves and the level of domestic credit. Second,
we have to use the ￿rst di⁄erence of consumer prices in the vector of endogenous variables which
implies that we also have to use real domestic credit (DCR
t ) and real banking system￿ s reserves
(BRR
t ). The VECM speci￿cation is therefore
￿Yt = ￿0 +
k X
i=1
￿i(￿Yt￿i) + ’1(￿Xt) + ￿(￿Yt￿1 + ￿1) + "t; (5)
where Y 0
t = [ ￿(IRt) ￿(Pt) DCR
t yt i￿
t ] and X0
t = [ REERt BRR
t ] are random vectors,
￿0 and ￿1 are 5x1 constant vectors and the error vector "t is such that E("t) = 0, E("t"0
s) = 0 if
t 6= s and E("t"0
s) = ￿ if t = s with det(￿) 6= 0.
The model is estimated with three lags in order to achieve normality (Jarque-Bera test) and
independence (LM test) of residuals. A lag exclusion (Wald) test is also implemented and we ￿nd
that the fourth lag can be excluded (Table 2).
The Johansen and Juselius (1990) cointegration method is used to estimate equation (5). This
method allows to test for the number of cointegrating vectors using a trace test. However, this test
could lead to an over rejection of the no cointegration hypothesis if we do not check for the cointe-
grating rank constancy and if we do not correct for the ￿nite sample bias. Consequently, forward
recursive trace tests are implemented to investigate the cointegrating rank stability. Moreover, the
trace test statistic is corrected for the ￿nite sample bias as suggested by Reinsel and Ahn (1992)
and Reimers (1991)10. The forward recursive trace tests with the ￿nite sample bias correction
(Figure 2) support the existence of one cointegrating vector11. Although the second cointegrating
vector is signi￿cant for the whole sample at the 1% level with the corrected trace test, this relation
is not signi￿cant at the 1% level before September 2005 and at the 5% level before September
10This correction does not consist in estimating new critical values but in multiplying the trace test statistic by
the scale factor (T ￿ pk)=T , where T is the number of observations, p the number of endogenous variables and k
the number of lags .
11All the recursive procedures have to be cautiously considered. The range of the initial sub-samples is small.
10200412.
3.2 Estimated cointegrating vectors
Table 2 displays the long term part of the VECM. The cointegrating vector (￿) represents the long
run relationship and adjustment coe¢ cients (￿) represent the weights attached to the cointegrating
relation in the individual equations of the model. The ￿rst estimation (￿1;￿1) considers the
homogeneity constraint between the ￿rst di⁄erence of international reserves and the ￿rst di⁄erence
of consumer prices. The LR test shows that the homogeneity restriction is not rejected at the
5% level (Table 2). Besides, the LR test does not support the nullity of other coe¢ cients in the
cointegrating vector. As expected, the ￿rst di⁄erence of international reserves exhibit in the long-
run a positive relationship with GDP and negative ones with real domestic credit and US real
interest rate. We also check that the equilibrium error is a stationary process. As a result, the
￿rst di⁄erence of international reserves and real domestic credit have a common stochastic trend.
Increases in the pace of international reserves accumulation are related to downward pressures in
real domestic credit and vice-versa, real domestic credit expansions are related to decrease in the
pace of international reserves accumulation. This outcome is consistent with monetary stability
and need to be more closely investigated.
The second estimation (￿2;￿2) also tests for the weak exogeneity of real domestic credit, GDP,
US real interest rate and the ￿rst di⁄erence of consumer prices. The LR test shows that these
restrictions are not rejected at the 5% level (Table 2). The ￿rst di⁄erence of international reserves
is therefore the only variable which responds to deviations from the long-run equilibrium. The
adjustment coe¢ cient on the error-correction term is negative (-0.8571) and highly signi￿cant which
is consistent with equilibrium correction behavior. When the error-correction term is positive, due
for example to a rise in US real interest rate, the ￿rst di⁄erence of international reserves decreases to
reach is its equilibrium. The speed of adjustment is equal to one minus the ￿rst order autoregressive
12The backward recursive trace test ￿ checking the cointegrating rank constancy in the baseline sample ￿ also
supports the existence of one cointegrating vector. This test is available upon request.
11coe¢ cient of the error-correction term (Phylaktis and Kassimatis, 1994). We ￿nd that 70% of the
gap between the ￿rst di⁄erence of international reserves and its equilibrium level is eliminated
every month. As a result, a given deviation in the cointegrating relation is reduced to 90% of
its original amount in 1.9 months13. This outcome results from the ￿xed exchange rate system.
Deviations in the cointegrating relation are corrected by the adjustment of international reserves.
In addition the estimated cointegrating vector represents the long run determination of the ￿rst
di⁄erence of international reserves since other variables are weakly exogenous.
The third estimation (￿3;￿3) directly considers the ￿rst di⁄erence of real international reserves.
This speci￿cation allows to reduce the scope of the VECM. The cointegrating vector is robust to
this speci￿cation. We also test if the exogenous variables should be introduced in the cointegrat-
ing vector (available upon request). We alternatively introduce real e⁄ective exchange rate and
banking system￿ s reserves in the cointegrating vector. The cointegrating vector is robust to these
speci￿cations and the LR test supports the nullity of the coe¢ cient associated with real e⁄ective
exchange rate and banking system￿ s reserves. Hence, we conclude that real e⁄ective exchange rate
and banking system￿ s reserves do not have to be introduced in the cointegrating vector.
The cointegrating vector ￿2 is recursively estimated in order to investigate its constancy. Several
restrictions have been made to obtain ￿2. Consequently, we also implement recursively the LR test.
Figure 3 shows that the LR test support recursively these restrictions at the 1% level. The recursive
estimations of coe¢ cients associated to real domestic credit (Figure 4), GDP (Figure 5) and US
real interest rate (Figure 6) support the stability of the VECM. Nevertheless we can notice that
recursively, the coe¢ cient associated to GDP is weakly signi￿cant, the two times standard error
band intersects with the horizontal axis. In addition, the coe¢ cient associated to real domestic
credit is signi￿cant but it is decreasing from January 2004.
As a result, the cointegrating vectors estimated in Table 2 support the negative relationship
between the ￿rst di⁄erence of international reserves and real domestic credit. This relationship is
13If s is the speed of adjustment and if f and g are the initial and ￿nal percentage deviation from equilibrium
respectively, the number of intervals from f to g is given by r = (ln(g)￿ln(f))=ln(1￿s) (Phylaktis and Kassimatis,
1994).
12robust to the di⁄erent speci￿cations but recursive estimation show that its magnitude is somewhat
decreasing.
3.3 Impulse responses
Impulse responses are used to analyze the dynamic interactions between variables and more pre-
cisely between the ￿rst di⁄erence of international reserves and real domestic credit. We use the
VECM speci￿cation (￿3;￿3) to implement these impulse responses. First, we implement a system
Sequential Estimation of Regressors (SER) procedure in order to test restrictions for the short run
parameters14. This strategy allows to ￿t a subset model removing insigni￿cant coe¢ cients.
The reduced-form residuals of this system are found to be instantaneously uncorrelated. We
can therefore conclude to the absence of any instantaneous causality between variables and we can
implement forecast error impulse responses.
We compute Hall￿ s studentized con￿dent intervals based on 2500 bootstrap replications and
100 replications for estimating the variance in each of the outer replication rounds. Standard
and Hall con￿dent intervals based on 2500 bootstrap replications give similar results but they are
not displayed on Figures 7a-j for clarity. We also use these three methods to compute con￿dent
intervals based only on 1000 bootstrap replications. Similar results are obtained which con￿rm the
robustness of the con￿dent intervals displayed on Figures 7a-j.
First, we consider a one-time impulse in the ￿rst di⁄erence of real international reserves (Figure
7a) and a one-time impulse in real domestic credit (Figure 7d). The shock in the ￿rst di⁄erence of
real international reserves is transitory because the adjustment force on international reserves is
strong (Table 2). Real domestic credit reacts negatively and signi￿cantly (Figure 7c) to this shock.
In addition the ￿rst di⁄erence of real international reserves reacts negatively and signi￿cantly
to the shock in real domestic credit (Figure 7b). These impulse responses support the negative
relationship between the ￿rst di⁄erence of real international reserves and real domestic credit. As
14The system SER procedure checks the parameter with the smallest t-ratio in each step. The elimination of this
parameter is based on the AIC criteria.
13a result, the increasing pace of international reserves accumulation in 2003 and 2004 did not lead
to an excessive credit expansion. When one component of money supply faces a positive shock,
the other one decreases to stabilize the overall money supply which is consistent with monetary
stability.
Second, we consider a one-time impulse in GDP (Figure 7g). The ￿rst di⁄erence of real interna-
tional reserves reacts positively and signi￿cantly to this shock (Figure 7e) which is consistent with
the cointegrating relation obtained in Table 2. Figure 7f shows also that the increase in the pace of
international reserves accumulation, caused by the GDP shock, is associated to downward pressures
in real domestic credit. After approximately 15 months, the series seems to reach equilibrium.
Finally, we consider a one-time impulse in US real interest rate (Figure 7j). The ￿rst di⁄erence
of real international reserves reacts negatively and signi￿cantly to this shock (Figure 7h) while real
domestic credit reacts positively and signi￿cantly (Figure 7i). The cut in the US interest rate from
2001 to 2004 was therefore a driving force in the increasing pace of international reserves accumu-
lation. However this upsurge in international reserves is also coupled with downward pressures in
real domestic credit which stabilize the overall money supply.
We therefore conclude that the rapid upsurge in international reserves in 2003 and 2004 did
not cause instability in domestic monetary conditions. The estimated cointegrating relations and
impulse responses show that the interaction between domestic credit and the ￿rst di⁄erence of
international reserves was negative and then consistent with monetary stability. We can now
examine how the PBC proceeded to get this result.
4 The management of net foreign assets
In a ￿xed exchange rate system, hot money in￿ ows lead the central bank to accumulate interna-
tional reserves. As a result, net foreign assets (NFA) in the central bank balance sheet expand.
Open market operations, reserve requirements and window guidance are the main instruments
used by policymakers to manage consequences of these capital in￿ ows on the domestic monetary
14sector15.
4.1 The sterilization policy
The PBC used open market operations to sterilize hot money in￿ ows. Central bank bills rather
than treasury bonds have been issued insofar as treasury bonds were managed to drive the money
market interest rate (Xie, 2004; Green, 2005). Central bank bills are recorded as net other assets
(NOA) in the central bank balance sheet (Hu, 2003). We can therefore investigate to which extent
the PBC used these open market operations to manage the monetary base. Figure 8 shows year
on year changes in components of the central bank balance sheet. Since 2003, the PBC has widely
used central bank bills to slow down the monetary base expansion but this only partially o⁄sets
the international reserves build-up. From end-2000 to end-2003, Higgins and Klitgaard (2004)
estimate that roughly half of NFA increase was sterilized by open market operations.
We can therefore compute an indicator of net foreign assets non sterilized by open market
operations (NFOAt = NFAt + NOAt). This indicator has a direct impact on monetary base
but not necessary on monetary aggregates and domestic credit. Indeed, the PBC can use reserve
requirements and window guidance to complete the sterilization process in a broader sense. Be-
tween the second half of 2003 and April 2004, the PBC raised banks￿reserve requirements ratio
from 6% to 7.5%. The PBC sought in this way to reduce the money multiplier in order to drain
liquidity. Furthermore, the PBC implemented window guidance to curb new lending (Hagiwara,
2004; Green, 2005). The PBC directly intervened in the lending of speci￿c banks to speci￿c sectors.
Since the four biggest banks ￿accounting for 69% of total bank deposits and 72% of total bank
loans ￿are state-owned banks, bank instructions were e¢ cient (Hu, 2003).
15Monetary authorities can also directly in￿uence demand and supply in the foreign exchange market in order
to manage of hot money in￿ows. Lu (2004) examines measures taken by Chinese authorities to ease appreciation
pressures on the RMB. Nevertheless, the liberalization of capital out￿ows could be counterproductive since this
could stimulate further in￿ows (Prasad et al., 2005).
154.2 Direct causality tests
The management of international reserves by the PBC is investigated with Granger causality tests
on vector autoregressive (VAR) models. This speci￿cation without explicit theoretical ground is
appropriate insofar as the PBC widely used, in a discretionary way, its control on the banking
sector. The state-owned banks were used as sterilization bonds buyers and they were also used
to implement the window guidance. Thus, even if the banking sector obtained a greater decision
making autonomy in its relations with ￿rms, the central bank kept the ability to directly intervene
in the banking sector to ensure monetary stability. This approach with VAR models allows therefore
to investigate the e¢ ciency of sterilization when various monetary measures at various times in
various intensities have been used (Takagi and Esaka, 1999).
We investigate with Granger causality tests if net foreign assets non sterilized by open market
operations (NFOA) a⁄ect the monetary sector. We use the Toda and Yamamoto (1995) and
Dolato and Lutkepohl (1996) procedure. This procedure does not require a cointegration analysis
and allow to mix orders of integration processes. This procedure is implemented in two steps.
First, we determine the maximum order of integration (dmax) of the variables in the system and
the lag length (k) of a VAR system in stationary form. Second, we estimate a VAR in level with
p = k + dmax lags. Granger causality tests consist to apply standard Wald tests to the ￿rst k
VAR coe¢ cient matrix.
We consider several VAR systems. First, we consider two bivariate systems including NFOA
and broad money (M2) or domestic credit. Second, we consider two multivariate systems including
real NFOA, GDP at constant prices, Chinese real interest rate (Chibor 3 month) and real broad
money or real domestic credit. Demand money motives are taken into account in these systems
which allow to check the robustness of the results obtained with bivariate systems. Finally, we
consider a trivariate system including NFOA, broad money and domestic credit in order to take
into account interactions between broad money and domestic credit.
We use the log transformation of index variable (January 1997=100) for all variables except
Chinese real interest rate. In addition, VAR systems are estimated using monthly data from March
161997 to March 200516.
Four unit root tests are implemented17: ADF, DF-GLS, Phillips-Perron and KPSS. We conclude
that all variables are non-stationary in levels but stationary in ￿rst-di⁄erences. NFOA is therefore
integrated of order one and unit root tests also showed that international reserves are integrated of
order two. This di⁄erent integration order underlines that open market operations were important
to slow down the monetary base expansion.
The optimal lag order of the VAR system in stationary form is chosen considering residual
statistical properties (normality and independence). We conclude that each system needs three
lags and we take into account dummies18 to get normality in the residuals. As a result, we estimate
VAR systems in level with 4 lags and Granger causality is tested with restrictions placed on lagged
terms up to the third lag.
Figure 9 displays the forward recursive causality tests from NFOA to M2. We conclude at
the 10% level that NFOA Granger caused M2 in the three di⁄erent VAR systems. Open market
operations and rises in reserve requirements did not drain all the liquidity. Nevertheless, the
monetary expansion would have been much more considerable without open market operations.
These operations were therefore the main banks opportunity in order to get out of excess liquidity
(Roubini and Setser, 2005a). Besides, Figure 10 shows the forward recursive causality tests from
NFOA to domestic credit. We conclude at the 10% level that NFOA did not Granger cause domestic
credit in the three estimated VAR systems. Hence, window guidance curbed credit growth and the
PBC succeeded in keeping domestic credit under control.
4.3 Indirect causality tests
NFOA could all the same have an indirect impact on domestic credit. Figure 11 displays the
forward recursive causality tests between broad money and domestic credit in the trivariate VAR
system. We conclude that there is a bidirectional causality between these two variables on the
16The Chinese interest rate is not available before March 1997 in the EcoWin database.
17These tests are available upon request.
18April 2001 in the bivariate systems; February 1999 in the multivariate systems; June 2006 and April 2001 in
the trivariate system.
17whole sample although the causality from domestic credit to broad money is not systematically
recursively con￿rmed. As a consequence, NFOA does not help to predict domestic credit one
period ahead but can still cause domestic credit several periods ahead with indirect impacts via
broad money.
Such indirect causality is investigated following Dufour et al. (2005). The trivariate VAR model
written at time t + 1 is established by
Wt+1 = ￿ +
4 X
l=1
￿lWt+1￿l + et+1; (6)
where t = 0;:::;T ￿ 1; W0
t+1 = ( NFOAt+1 DCt+1 M2t+1 ) is a 3x1 random vector, ￿ is a
3x1 constant vectors and the error vector et is such that E(et) = 0, E(ete0
s) = 0 if t 6= s and
E(ete0
s) = ￿ if t = s with det(￿) 6= 0.
Equation (6) represents a VAR model at horizon one. This model can be expanded to become
an autoregressive process at horizon h. As suggesting by Dufour et al. (2005), we consider the
following unrestricted model









where h < T and ’0 = I:
The Granger causality is tested at horizon h applying standard Wald tests to the ￿rst 3 VAR
coe¢ cient matrix. Besides, we use the heteroskedasticity-autocorrelation consistent estimator de-
veloped by Newey and West (1987) to deal with the MA(h-1) error process. The cost of this simple
procedure is a loss of e¢ ciency since the unrestricted estimated model does not use all information.
The highest horizon we need to examine is h = 4(= 1x3 + 1) according to Dufour and Renault
(1998): we have one auxiliary variable (M2), the lag order of the VAR system in stationary form
is three and direct causality corresponds to h = 1.
Figure 12 displays recursive indirect causality tests from NFOA to domestic credit. We conclude
18that NFOA did not indirectly Granger causes domestic credit at the 10% level. The indirect
causality test at horizon 3 is signi￿cant at the 10% level at the beginning of the recursive procedure
but this outcome is not robust after January 2004. Open market operations and window guidance
allowed therefore to manage direct and indirect (via the loose liquidity conditions) e⁄ects of net
foreign assets on domestic credit.
4.4 Costs of the sterilization policy
Several costs resulting from the PBC sterilization policy have been highlighted (Roubini and Setser,
2005a-b; Goldstein and Lardy, 2005). First, the PBC used the state-owned banks as sterilization
bonds buyers. Although these bonds pay more than the 1% associated with excess reserves,
banks face a pro￿tability issue. Sterilization bonds yield is close to the one on deposits and
excess reserves result from quantitative constraints on bank lending. Consequently, the sterilization
policy worsened the banking system weaknesses. Second, reserves management did not cause a
pro￿tability issue to the PBC insofar as its sterilization costs are largely o⁄set by interest income
on its reserves portfolio. Nevertheless, the PBC is threatened with an exchange rate risk and will
face capital losses following an exchange rate revaluation. Roubini and Setser (2005a) estimate
that a 33% RMB depreciation in 2004 would have represented a $150 billion loss which corresponds
to 10% of China GDP. The PBC, that is taxpayers, is therefore exposed to the potential cost of the
current sterilization policy. Lastly, sterilization measures can promote additional capital in￿ ows
since they limit the narrow and broad money expansions and therefore keep the level of domestic
interest rates high. These additional capital in￿ ows only occur when market participants consider
that a higher risk premium on domestic assets does not o⁄set these higher interest rates (Takagi
and Esaka, 1999).
These costs associated with the upsurge in net foreign assets justify why China moved toward
greater exchange rate ￿ exibility in July 2005. This evolution is the more suitable to temper the
excess of the domestic ￿nancial system and will enhance the ability of the PBC to tailor money
and credit conditions to domestics needs (Eichengreen, 2004; Prasad et al. 2005).
195 Conclusion
Since the 1987 US stock market crash, the Federal Reserve has been using demand stimuli during
downturns to ￿ ood the ￿nancial system with liquidity. Following the ￿dot com￿bubble crash, the
Federal Reserve kept interest rate lower and longer than in previous cycles. These loose monetary
conditions led to hot money in￿ ows in China, which boosted economic performances, triggered
expectations of currency appreciation and ￿nally caused more capital in￿ ows.
Capital controls did not prevent hot money in￿ ows since these controls have become less ef-
fective over time. As a result, the pace of international reserves accumulation in China increased
signi￿cantly in 2003 and 2004. Chinese authorities delayed for a long time the move toward more
exchange rate ￿ exibility but they succeeded in managing the international reserves build-up. The
estimated VECM shows that the relationship between domestic credit and the ￿rst di⁄erence of
international reserves was stable and consistent with monetary stability. Moreover, direct and
indirect causality tests display that the sterilization policy implemented by the PBC allowed to
manage the e⁄ect of net foreign asset on domestic credit.
However, the sterilization policy was costly and it was not sustainable in the long run for the
banking sector. Consequently, the PBC decided to start a shift in its currency policy. The PBC
announced a 2.1% appreciation of the RMB against the dollar and a move to a managed ￿ oat with
reference to a basket of currencies in July 2005. This managed ￿ oating exchange rate suggests that
the Chinese demand for dollar-denominated asset is likely to be reduced. This evolution is the
more suitable to temper the excess of the domestic ￿nancial system and will enhance the ability
of the PBC to tailor money and credit conditions to domestics needs (Eichengreen, 2004).
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Data Appendix
Data are collected from three sources: the Asia Regional Information Center (ARIC) database,
the EcoWin database and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database..
The monthly series retrieved from the ARIC database are the international reserves (Total
reserves minus gold), the consumer price index (CPI), the gross domestic product (GDP) and the
industrial production index (IPI) used in the Chow and Lin (1971) method. The price series has
been seasonally adjusted by the Census X-12 routine (with multiplicative factors on the levels).
The monthly series retrieved from the EcoWin database are the Chibor 3 month interest rate
and the Libor 3 month interest rate.
The monthly series retrieved from IFS are the US consumer price index, the real e⁄ective
exchange rate, the domestic credit, the bank￿ s reserves (claims on PBC), the broad money (money
plus quasi-money), net foreign assets and net other assets in the PBC balance sheet. Series from
monetary authorities, banking institutions and banking survey are interpolated from quarterly
data before 1999.
23Table 1: The balance of payment
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Current Account 17.40 35.42 45.87 68.66 160.82
Financial Account 34.83 32.34 97.77 110.73 58.86
Direct Investment 37.35 46.79 47.23 53.13 67.82
Portfolio Investment -19.41 -10.34 11.43 19.69 -4.93
Other Investment 16.88 -4.11 39.11 37.91 -4.03
Errors and Omissions -4.86 7.79 18.42 27.05 -16.77
Hot Money -7.38 -6.65 68.96 84.64 -25.72
Reserve Assets -47.32 -75.51 -117.02 -206.36 -207.07
Unit: billion of dollars. Source: EcoWin database.
Note 1: "Other investment" in 2003 includes the $45 billions used to recapitalize two state commercial banks.
Note 2: "Hot Money" = "Portfolio Investment" + "Other Investment" + "Errors and Omissions"
24Table 2: Long term part of the VECM
￿ECt = ￿(￿Yt￿1 + ￿1) where Y 0
t￿1 = [ ￿(IRt￿1) ￿(Pt￿1) DCR
t￿1 yt￿1 i￿
t￿1 ]
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Note: The speed of adjustment is equal to one minus the ￿rst order autoregressive coe¢ cient of the error-correction
term (ECt). The 90% adjustment is equal to ln(1.10)/ln(1-s) where s is the speed of adjustment (Phylaktis and
Kassimatis, 1994).
25Figure 1: Interest rates and China￿ s GIR
Note: GIR: Index of Gross International Reserves (June 1997=100). Source: ARIC database and EcoWin database.
Figure 2: Forward recursive trace test
Note: Trace 1 (2) represents the trace statistic for 1 (2) cointegrating relation. Trace 1c (2c) represents the trace
statistic for 1 (2) cointegrating relation including the ￿nite sample bias correction.
Figure 3: Forward recursive LR test
26Figure 4: Forward recursive estimation: real domestic credit
Note: The dotted lines represent the two times standard error bands.
Figure 5: Forward recursive estimation: GDP
Figure 6: Forward recursive estimation: US real interest rate
27Figure 7a-j: VECM forecast error impulse reponses
a- Response of ￿(IRt) to ￿(IRt) b- Response of ￿(IRt) to DCt
c- Response of DCt to ￿(IRt) d- Response of DCt to DCt
e- Response of ￿(IRt) to GDPt f- Response of DCt to GDPt
g- Response of GDPt to GDPt j- Response of i￿
t to i￿
t
28h- Response of ￿(IRt) to i￿
t i- Response of DCt to i￿
t
Note: Con￿dent intervals represent the 95% studentized Hall intervals based on 2500 bootstrap replications and
100 replications for estimating the variance in each of the outer replication rounds. These impulses responses are
computed with JMulti 4.02 (L￿tkepohl and Kr￿tzig, 2004)
Table 8: Year on year changes in the PBC balance sheet
Note: MBt = NFAt + NDAt + NOAt. Changes in NDAt are quite small since 2001, so they are not displayed.
Source: IMF IFS database.
Figure 9: Forward recursive causality test from NFOA to M2
Note: H0: NFOA does not Granger cause M2.
29Figure 10: Forward recursive causality test from NFOA to DC
Note: H0: NFOA does not Granger cause DC.
Figure 11: Forward recursive causality test between M2 and DC
Figure 12: Forward recursive indirect causality test from NFOA to DC
Note: H0: NFOA does not Granger cause DC.
30